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phooph
11-29-2007, 11:12 PM
The Financial Tsunami: Sub-Prime Mortgage Debt is but the Tip of the Iceberg


by F. William Engdahl

Global Research, November 23, 2007

Part 1:*Deutsche Bank’s painful lesson*****************
Even experienced banker friends tell me that they think the worst of the US banking troubles are over and that things are slowly getting back to normal. What is lacking in their rosy optimism is the realization of the scale of the ongoing deterioration in credit markets globally, centered in the American asset-backed securities market, and especially in the market for CDO’s—Collateralized Debt Obligations and CMO’s—Collateralized Mortgage Obligations. By now every serious reader has heard the term “It’s a crisis in Sub-Prime US home mortgage debt.” What almost no one I know understands is that the Sub-Prime problem is but the tip of a colossal iceberg that is in a slow meltdown. I offer one recent example to illustrate my point that the “Financial Tsunami” is only beginning.
Deutsche Bank got a hard shock a few days ago when a judge in the state of Ohio in the USA made a ruling that the bank had no legal right to foreclose on 14 homes whose owners had failed to keep current in their monthly mortgage payments. Now this might sound like small beer for Deutsche Bank, one of the world’s largest banks with over €1.1 trillion (Billionen) in assets worldwide. As Hilmar Kopper used to say, “peanuts.” It’s not at all peanuts, however, for the Anglo-Saxon banking world and its European allies like Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Barclays Bank, HSBC or others. Why?
A US Federal Judge, C.A. Boyko in Federal District Court in Cleveland Ohio ruled*to dismiss a claim by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. DB’s US subsidiary was seeking to take possession of 14 homes from Cleveland residents living in them, in order to claim the assets.
Here comes the hair in the soup. The Judge asked DB to show documents proving legal title to the 14 homes. DB could not. All DB attorneys could show was a document showing only an “intent to convey the rights in the mortgages.” They could not produce the actual mortgage, the heart of Western property rights since the Magna Charta if not longer.
Again why could Deutsche Bank not show the 14 mortgages on the 14 homes? Because they live in the exotic new world of “global securitization”, where banks like DB or Citigroup buy tens of thousands of*mortgages from small local lending banks, “bundle” them into Jumbo new securities which then are rated by Moody’s or Standard & Poors or Fitch, and sell them as bonds to pension funds or other banks or private investors who naively believed they were buying bonds rated AAA, the highest, and never realized that their “bundle” of say 1,000 different home mortgages, contained maybe 20% or 200 mortgages rated “sub-prime,” i.e. of dubious credit quality.
Indeed the profits being earned in the past seven years by the world’s largest financial players from Goldman Sachs to Morgan Stanley to HSBC, Chase, and yes, Deutsche Bank, were so staggering, few bothered to open the risk models used by the professionals who bundled the mortgages. Certainly not the Big Three rating companies who had a criminal conflict of interest in giving top debt ratings. That changed abruptly last August and since then the major banks have issued one after another report of disastrous “sub-prime” losses.
A new unexpected factor
The Ohio ruling that dismissed DB’s claim to foreclose and take back 14 homes for non-payment, is far more than bad luck for the bank of Josef*Ackermann. It is an earth-shaking precedent for all banks holding what they had thought were collateral in form of real estate property.
How this? Because of the complex structure of asset-backed securities and the widely dispersed ownership of mortgage securities (not actual mortgages but the securities based on same) no one is yet able to identify who precisely holds the physical mortgage document. Oops! A tiny legal detail our Wall Street Rocket Scientist derivatives experts ignored when they were bundling and issuing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of CMO’s in the past six or seven years. As of January 2007 some $6.5 trillion of securitized mortgage debt was outstanding in the United States. That’s a lot by any measure!
In the Ohio case Deutsche Bank is acting as “Trustee” for “securitization pools” or groups of disparate investors who may reside anywhere. But the Trustee never got the legal document known as the mortgage. Judge Boyko ordered DB to prove they were the owners of the mortgages or notes and they could not. DB could only argue that the banks had foreclosed on such cases for years without challenge. The Judge then declared that the banks “seem to adopt the attitude that since they have been doing this for so long, unchallenged, this practice equates with legal compliance. Finally put to the test,” the Judge concluded, “their weak legal arguments compel the court to stop them at the gate.” Deutsche Bank has refused comment.
What next?
As news of this legal precedent spreads across the USA like a California brushfire, hundreds of thousands of struggling homeowners who took the bait in times of historically low interest rates to buy a home with often, no money paid down, and the first 2 years with extremely low interest rate in what are known as “interest only” Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs), now face exploding mortgage monthly payments at just the point the US economy is sinking into severe recession. (I regret the plethora of abbreviations used here but it is the fault of Wall Street bankers not this author).
The peak period of the US real estate bubble which began in about 2002 when Alan Greenspan began the most aggressive series of rate cuts in Federal Reserve history was 2005-2006. Greenspan’s intent, as he admitted at the time, was to replace the Dot.com internet stock bubble with a real estate home investment and lending bubble. He argued that was the only way to keep the US economy from deep recession. In retrospect a recession in 2002 would have been far milder and less damaging than what we now face.
Of course, Greenspan has since safely retired, written his memoirs and handed the control (and blame) of the mess over to a young ex-Princeton professor, Ben Bernanke. As a Princeton graduate, I can say I would never trust monetary policy for the world’s most powerful central bank in the hands of a Princeton economics professor. Keep them in their ivy-covered towers.
Now the last phase of every speculative bubble is the one where the animal juices get the most excited. This has been the case with every major speculative bubble since the Holland Tulip speculation of the 1630’s to the South Sea Bubble of 1720 to the 1929 Wall Street crash. It was true as well with the US 2002-2007 Real Estate bubble. In the last two years of the boom in selling real estate loans, banks were convinced they could resell the mortgage loans to a Wall Street financial house who would bundle it with thousands of good better and worse quality mortgage loans and resell them as Collateralized Mortgage Obligation bonds. In the flush of greed, banks became increasingly reckless of the credit worthiness of the prospective home owners. In many cases they did not even bother to check if the person was employed. Who cares? It will be resold and securitized and the risk of mortgage default was historically low.
That was in 2005. The most Sub-prime mortgages written with Adjustable Rate Mortgage contracts were written between 2005-2006, the last and most furious phase of the US bubble. Now a whole new wave of mortgage defaults is about to explode onto the scene beginning January 2008. Between December 2007 and July 1, 2008 more than $690 Billion in mortgages will face an interest rate jump according to the contract terms of the ARMs written two years before. That means market interest rates for those mortgages will explode monthly payments just as recession drives incomes down. Hundreds of thousands of homeowners will be forced to do the last resort of any homeowner: stop monthly mortgage payments.
Here is where the Ohio court decision guarantees that the next phase of the US mortgage crisis will assume Tsunami dimension. If the Ohio Deutsche Bank precedent holds in the appeal to the Supreme Court, millions of homes will be in default but the banks prevented from seizing them as collateral assets to resell. Robert Shiller of Yale, the controversial and often correct author of the book, Irrational Exuberance, predicting the 2001-2 Dot.com stock crash, estimates US housing prices could fall as much as 50% in some areas given how home prices have diverged relative to rents.
The $690 billion worth of “interest only” ARMs due for interest rate hike between now and July 2008 are by and large not Sub-prime but a little higher quality, but only just. There are a total of $1.4 trillion in “interest only” ARMs according to the US research firm, First American Loan Performance. A recent study calculates that, as these ARMs face staggering higher interest costs in the next 9 months, more than $325 billion of the loans will default leaving 1 million property owners in technical mortgage default. But if banks are unable to reclaim the homes as assets to offset the non-performing mortgages, the US banking system and a chunk of the global banking system faces a financial gridlock that will make events to date truly “peanuts” by comparison. We will discuss the global geo-political implications of this in our next report, The Financial Tsunami: Part 2.
F. William Engdahl is*the author of A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization*(CRG).* His most recent book, which has just been released*by Global Research*is Seeds of Destruction, The Hidden Agenda of Genetic Manipulation.*
https://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7413

Lorrie
12-03-2007, 09:37 AM
Because the big banks dont own the mortgage do the people get to keep their houses? Or is this a situation where these people have gone to default and lose it anyway?

How much do you think a house will be worth when everything has crashed and after the mess has settled...?

Well, I have always wanted to own my own home, but found it impossible...for me anyway. I am wondering if I am still alive that when its over I could actually have one.
:hmmm:


The Financial Tsunami: Sub-Prime Mortgage Debt is but the Tip of the Iceberg


by F. William Engdahl

Global Research, November 23, 2007

Part 1:*Deutsche Bank’s painful lesson*****************
Even experienced banker friends tell me that they think the worst of the US banking troubles are over and that things are slowly getting back to normal. What is lacking in their rosy optimism is the realization of the scale of the ongoing deterioration in credit markets globally...

Zeno Swijtink
12-03-2007, 03:27 PM
Here is a next step in a story of financial unravelling. Can't say how plausible this is. The writer seems to feel too certain of himself.


*******

Major Financial Disruption

Message from John L. Petersen:
It appears that the world in general and the United States in particular are on the edge of a major disruption in the global financial system. Here‚s the summary as we see it.


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11/14/2007
Author: Ken Dabkowski

At a recent Board meeting of The Arlington Institute, Dr. David Martin, CEO of M・CAM and one of the members of the Board was asked for his assessment of the global financial situation in the coming months.

Here are my notes from his response:

I stand by my commentary in July of ‚06.

The next shoe to fall is consumer credit

Currently as reports came in on the 3rd quarter, foreclosures were up 470% this quarter alone. *They will be up over 500% this coming quarter (4th). A foreclosure in our terms is when the bank has officially declared an account insolvent and tries to regain the asset (if it exists). The person who is foreclosed upon can no longer secure any traditional consumer credit. This in turn goes straight to the banks as no one will be able to get the store issued charge cards.

A minority of people pay off their consumer debt every month. When one considers the combination of consumer credit card debt and the compounded debt of „home equity‰ financing, we estimate that less than 20% of people actually carry no consumer credit from one month to the next. Many of the ones who don‚t pay off their carried consumer debt have at least one credit card at its limit and therefore lack credit capacity. Most have their paycheck directly covering bills and servicing the minimum balance due.

Therefore people who are foreclosed upon will not be able to obtain credit and since their paychecks will be maxed out, there will not be extra cash left over from the paycheck to service a new debt.

Next, everybody buys things at Christmas. As much as 40% of retail sales are done in the 4th quarter of the year ˆ i.e. the retail miracle. The purchase decline in retail goods this fourth quarter will occur because many credit-only consumers will lack the credit capacity mentioned above. Frequently, people overcharge their limit and the banks (albeit a profit center for subprime credit users) levy a penalty by increasing interest rates and charging additional fees. In the 4th quarter of 2007, the amount of people overcharging their limits will be too many for the banks to handle. We do not have a system in place to deal with overcharge on that scale. A substantial number of this December‚s purchases will go into an overdraft on credit limits.

CDO ˆ Collateral Debt Obligation ˆ Consumer Credit

Consumer credit pooled debt investment instruments (a form of CDO) are originated and rated based on underlying historical credit behavior and a complex series of predictive models for repayment dynamics. CDOs have „strips‰ which are a combination of similar profile tranches within a larger investment product. Based on the market‚s appetite for risk, investment performance guarantees (or credit enhancements) are packaged with the credits. These credit guarantees are issued by insurance companies, reinsurance companies, and other specialty finance companies ˆ many operating with extra-territorial jurisdiction rendering fiscal oversight more complicated.

These strips come in several categories:

Investment grade
Almost investment grade
Junk and
Why did we give them a credit card?

All of these grades are priced on historical default rates. The credit insurance companies (AIG, MBIA, Ambac, Financial Security Assurance, Channel Re, XL, Zurich Re and other reinsurers) have, from time to time, issued credit guarantees to the securities. Banks sell debt in the form of a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO).

Minor shifts in default actuarial activity (+/- 25 basis points) from normative behavior is absorbed within pricing of these financial guaranty contracts. However fundamental shifts (hundreds or thousands of basis points in one quarter) are not built into the model and result in credit enhancement insolvency on a major scale. When the insurer cannot pay based on its own liquidity impairment, the bank is left with catastrophic (an insurance term for excessive loss outside of expected) exposure.

If in a single quarter we have an increased foreclosure rate of 400% (or 4000 basis points) the insurance contracts simply cannot handle that kind of drastic shift as evidenced by the write offs in the third quarter. When we will follow the drastic third quarter with a loss of 500% in the fourth quarter, the trajectory becomes clear.

Neither the banking nor the insurance industry has a historical experience in dealing with this type of challenge and neither has the liquidity linked to these contracts to support system wide collapse.

Where was the announcement of this? There was no announcement.



However Hank Greenberg is resurfacing in AIG leadership even during an SEC investigation because without him, no one else can remember where the counterparty risks are. In order to save the insurance industry, shareholders have looked past alleged SEC violations as there is no one with Mr. Greenberg‚s awareness of the market and counterparty agreements who can hope to navigate the coming challenges. In the 4th quarter, the US will have another record foreclosure announcement. Once you‚re over 25% (25 basis point) foreclosure, all models are broken.

Under a consumer credit melt-down, Capital One and/or Wachovia are likely going to put a massive foreclosure liability to an insurance company and the insurance company will not have liquidity to cover the exposure.

This is the problem we got into when we issued credit card debt on top of secondary mortgages ˆ (inflated the value of the home) and gave out credit based on faux equity that no one really had.*

The reason why this problem is the second shoe to fall (subprime mortgage collapse was the first shoe) is because consumer credit has a different foreclosure frequency than traditional mortgage credit.

December is when the maturity of the giant buyout of the economy moves.

By December, you‚ll have a second round of charge offs based on consumer credit. The real big problem ˆ when you foreclose on consumer credit, people stop buying things. When people stop buying things, we don‚t have a tertiary way to pump liquidity into the market. People won‚t have extra cash from their paychecks and won‚t have capacity on their cards.

Try this case study:

Go to the mall and stand in front of counter at Victoria Secret. Watch what happens when someone wants to pay with cash. The clerk won‚t know how to ring up cash. They will need a manager to come over to give change and unlock drawers. When you don‚t have capacity on those cards, you don‚t buy things. VISA credit cards actually denigrate using cash in their run-up-to-Christmas add campaign.

Next, go to any savings bank data set. If you were going to spend $1000 in cash this Christmas, can you do it? *For the most part, the answer would be „no‰ because we have had a net negative spending for the last 5 years.

Therefore there will be depressed consumer spending this Christmas but what is spent, people will overcharge. This will take what used to be good investments in CDOs and will change the dynamic. If you used to be a person who paid their bills on time, you will now only pay half. If the credit companies are counting on the top two tranches to pay their card off in full and they don‚t, they won‚t have liquidity to cover the rest. The banks cannot afford the top tranch paying half.

The estimates are out. There will be at least $400B in the first round of charge offs in the CDO market.

We‚re not going to be done with the subprime mortgage when the CDOs fall. Therefore we will have an insolvency problem with the banks that are mentioned above.

This is the kiss of death of a privately held Federal Reserve. For the Federal Reserve to function, its stakeholder banks (like JP Morgan Chase) must remain viable and liquid. When one of them, or any major bank in the U.S. (like Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo, Bank of New York, Washington Mutual, etc.) is impaired or ceases to exist, the architecture of the Fed‚s capacity to respond to systemic challenges is unsustainable.

If the banks have no money, they can‚t pump liquidity into the market. Taking half of a trillion dollars out of market in a single distressed write down becomes problematic. The US banking system does not have the liquidity to take the hit.

The actual solvency of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is relatively indecipherable due to the fact that their treasury management processes (and the risks of their own investment strategies) are not uniformly disclosed with sufficient transparency. The FDIC was set up for isolated problems with a few bad banks but is NOT prepared to „insure‰ the system in an industry-wide crisis. The actual liquidity reserve of the „insurance‰ that Americans view as their safety net is 1/100th the actual exposure of outstanding deposits. The actual coverage ratio for the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) fell below 1.25% in 2002, the same year that less stable credit practices were adopted by America‚s leading banks.

The funny part is that the Federal Government will be on holiday when all of this happens. There will be no one to put freeze actions and moratoria on actions. The only way you stop the cataclysm is to put together civil actions on deposit withdrawals.

As I discussed previously, the Chinese currency wild-card may become relevant far sooner than expected. An effort by China to convert its $1.4 trillion U.S. Treasury holdings into euros is not viable for many reasons ˆ not the least of which is the European Central Bank‚s inability to absorb such an event. As China continues its rush away from supporting U.S. Treasuries and as Middle Eastern investors are buying them up in more diversified holdings, a new „currency exchange‰ is unfolding. Realizing that they cannot liquidate their holdings, it appears that the Chinese are currently using their U.S. Treasury holdings as collateral for euro denominated purchases and long term infrastructure transactions. In other words, they may be „liquidating‰ their holdings as collateral and, in so doing, effectively migrating to non-dollar value without ever having to officially dump their current Treasury holdings.

Therefore, collateralize the credit in dollars ˆ especially if you‚re long in dollars. The lender/financier won‚t call the note because you have it structured in such a way to both allow it to perform and hold illiquid collateral that no one wants. This essentially inflates euros. Although you can‚t sell dollars, the whole purpose of collateral is that it is a second source of payment ˆ collateral is there to down rate the risk of the loan. Secondary becomes irrelevant.

When February comes, the Chinese are going to do something as they will have to decide what the exposure is going to be with the treasury. As I see it they have to just dump the treasury. They only keep it because they can use it ˆ they have 43% direct/indirect of US treasuries so they‚ll dump them on the market.

The US Congressional pressures to decouple the RMB will work, but not in the way we want. Our plan includes helping them hold on to the treasuries, it does not involve them not holding the dollar anymore. The US wanted the tether to be part of the float. This will cause disenfranchisement of the US electorate (during primary season). February is also when public (media) will realize we won‚t pull out of this.

Side note: Mayor Bloomberg could enter the race at this point, being the savior candidate (at least economically), but has $1B dollars in non-liquid money so he may not be able to enter.

March is when we realize that the dollar doesn‚t come back.*



OPEC price with the whole fluctuation of oil futures presages the event. They are going to run the price of oil as high as they can get it on the dollar, while buying US treasuries from China with the money. When the dollar does collapse, they‚ll flip denominations. The wild card is long about March when the OPEC cuts spot oil off the dollar to the euro. One can look at the current oil price at close to $100/barrel and fail to see that, as this premium price is currently turning around and investing in a weakening dollar, the effective price (less the dollar investment hedge) is probably closer to $50/barrel than the spot price reflects.

Currency problems will change the game ˆ they are financially structuring themselves to take the hit.

When we can‚t afford to buy oil commodities on a spot market ˆ it compounds the problem however the consumer that Saudi Arabia ships to is liquid (China). In the US it is a big problem. There is still a market for oil; it just changes. When you come out of Straits of Hormuz, turn left.



John L. Petersen